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THE DRILLING CLAUSE IN OIL AND GAS LEASES
IN WEST VIRGINIA*
ROBERT TUCKER DONLEY"
INTRODUCTION
The Drilling Clause. The purpose of the drilling clause is to
secure prompt exploration and testing of the land or, in lieu there-
of, the lessee's obligation for payment of a stipulated sum (called
delay rental or commutation money) to the lessor for the privilege
of deferring drilling for an agreed period-in which case it is de-
nominated the "drill or pay" type of clause. The consequences of
the lessee's failure to do either will be discussed in subsequent sec-
tions. The second-and perhaps now the more commonly used-type
of drilling clause is the "unless" provision, whereby the lessee doe'
not obligate himself either to drill or to pay delay rental, but his
failure to do either results in the automatic termination of his ex-
ploratory privileges; the lease comes to an end. It is therefore ap-
parent that with this type of clause the lessee does not need the pro-
tection of a surrender clause in order to escape liability for failure
to drill. He may simply do nothing and let his leasehold estate
terminate and there is an end to the relationship between the par-
ties. However, in the drill or pay type of clause, the lessee does
nee'd the device of a surrender clause in order that he may avoid
liability for nonperformance of either of his alternative promises
where it appears that the field is a nonproductive one. With either
type of clause the lessor is protected, but not in quite the same way.
In the former, he is assured either that his land will be tested or
that he will receive compensation in lieu thereof; and in addition,
it is common to add the protection of a forfeiture clause' enabling
the lessor to declare a termination of the lease for failure either to
drill or to pay. In the unless type, he is assured either that his land
will be tested or that it will be freed of the lease.
' This article is the tentative draft of a chapter in a book now in the
course of preparation by the author, on the West Virginia Law of Coal, Oil
and Gas. Copyrighted, 1950, by Robert T. Donley.
** Professor of law, West Virginia University; member of the Monongalia
County bar.
1 In the absence of a forfeiture clause in a drill or pay type, the lessee may
lose his rights under the doctrine of abandonment, Smith v. Root, 66 W. Va.
633, 66 S. E. 1005 (1910). But in the absence of a forfeiture clause the lease
cannot be forfeited merely for nonpayment of delay rental; there must be either
surrender, abandonment or expiration of the term. Reserve Gas Co. v. Carbon
Black Mfg. Co., 72 IV. Va. 757, 79 S. E. 1002 (1913).
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The Drill or Pay Clause. In ordinary leases, upon the com-
pletion of a producing well, the drilling clause is eliminated from
further consideration; it has served its purpose. However, in Engel
v. Eastern Oil Co., 2 it was provided that "The completion of a well
shall stop the [delay] rental only on one-third of this tract of land,
and it is further agreed that if the [lessees] fail to pay rental as and
when due, this lease shall become null and void." After the com-
pletion of a well, the lessees innocently failed to pay the reduced
delay rental in advance for two quarters, and the lessor refused a
later tender thereof and sued in equity to enforce the forfeiture.
Relief was denied, it being held that upon discovery of gas the
lessees acquired a vested estate; that a court of equity will not en-
force a forfeiture of a vested estate merely for failure to pay rent
when the default is not wilful and application for relief (by way of
the lessee's answer, offering to pay past-due rentals with interest) is
seasonably made.
In addition, the court stated (although not embodied in the
syllabi) that the lessor had a statutory remedy for the enforcement
of a forfeiture,3 and that the lessee had a statutory remedy for relief
against such forfeiture.4 Assuming that this statement is a binding
precedenta it would seem that the provisions of the statute, quoted
in the footnotes, are certainly broad enough to cover cases in which
there has been no discovery of mineral and the lessee is either wil-
fully, or nonwilfully, at fault in failing to pay delay rentals. If so,
the "vested estate" doctrine of the Engle case was not necessary to
2 100 W. Va. 301, 130 S. E. 491 (1925). Accord, where lessee drilled
producing well: Craig v. Hukill, 37 W. Va. 520, 16 S. E. 363 (1892).
3 W. VA. CoDE c. 37, art. 6, §19 (Michie, §3669): "Any person who shall have
the right of reentry into the lands by reason of any rent issuing thereout being
in arrear, or by reason of the breach of any covenant or condition, may serve a
declaration in ejectment .... or may commence an action of unlawful detainer
.... and recover judgment." Service of process, in person or by publication,
"shall be in lieu of demand and reentry."
4 W. VA. CODE c. 37, art. 6, §20 (Michie, §3670); "Should the defendant...
not pay the rent in arrear, with interest and costs, nor file a bill in equity for
relief against such forfeiture, within twelve months after execution executed,
he shall be barred of all rights, in law or equity, to be restored to such lands or
tenements." Section 22 provides that the lessee shall not be entitled to enjoin
the lessor's action of ejectment or of unlawful detainer unless, within thirty
days after the filing of the lessor's answer, he deposits the sum claimed to be in
arrear. Section 23 provides that the lessee may stop the proceeding in ejectment
or in unlawful detainer at any time before trial by paying or tendering the
rent and arrears, with interest and costs.
In Beech Fork Coal Co. v. Pocahontas Corp., 109 W. Va. 39, 45, 152 S. E.
785 (1930) it was said: "This right of relief from a forfeiture for failure to pay
the rent in arrear is also specifically recognized in section 17, Chapter 93 of the
Code."
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its decisions. Moreover, if the statement is sound law, the conse-
quence is that it is impossible in West Virginia (but for the recent-
ly enacted statutory method of cancellation, hereinafter discussed)
to draft a drill or pay clause, the nonperformance of which will re-
sult in termination of the lease beyond the power of the lessee to re-
instate it. If so, from the standpoint of the lessor, the unless type of
clause may be preferable because nonpayment of delay rentals re-
sults in the extinction of the lease; there is no forfeiture to enforce
or to relieve against. Which type the lessor should choose will prob-
ably depend upon whether he is primarily interested in receiving
the delay rentals, or in having his land promptly tested.
Relief from Forfeiture-Effect of Statute. But it is by no means
clear that an oil and gas lessee is in every instance, and irrespective
of the circumstances, entitled to relief, under the statute, by paying
or offering to pay the past-due delay rentals. The statute is an old
one, enacted before the development of the oil and gas industry
and has been but slightly modified by the 1931 Code. Its application
was denied in Hukill v. Guftey.6 The facts were that, in a former
case,7 a lease provided that the lessee should commence operations
within nine months or thereafter pay to the lessor $1.33-1/3 per
aonth until work was commenced, and that a failure to do either
should work an absolute forfeiture of the lease. Upon the nonper-
formance by the lessee, the lessor executed a new lease. The second
lessee obtained judgment in an action of unlawful detainer against
the first lessee. Then, within one year after this judgment, the first
lessee instituted a suit in equity against the second lessee praying for
an injunction restraining execution of the writ of possession issued
on the aforesaid judgment in unlawful detainer, and for relief from
the forfeiture of the first lease. It was held that the fact of the for-
feiture was res judicata and could not be relitigated in the equity
suit, and-more important to the present discussion-that "under
the circumstances of the case, the senior lessee, and those claiming
under him, are not entitled to be relieved against the forfeiture by
paying [the past-due delay rentals]. The damages to be looked to
are the damages resulting from the breach of the covenant to bore
for oil, and not the failure to pay one dollar and thirty-three and
one-third cents per month in lieu thereof; and the damages resulting
from the failure to do the specified things, viz., to bore for oil, not
0 37 W. Va. 425, 16 S. E. 544 (1892).
Guffey v. Hukill, 34 W. Va. 49, 11 S. E. 754 (1890).
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being susceptible of pecuniary measurement, and therefore not com-
pensable, the relief from such forfeiture is denied."
The leased land was in a highly productive field and the court
pointed out that if a well had been drilled the lessor might have
obtained royalties amounting in one day to the entire delay rental
for one year; and the lessee "cannot base his claim to relief from
forfeiture by asking a court of conscience that it may be done by
the enforcement of the quasi penalty of making the lessor take the
unsubstantial alternative commutation money because it is so con-
tracted for in the forfeited lease which he wishes to restore to life
on equitable grounds."
The Hukill case stands unreversed and unmodified by any
later decision of the court." It was not cited in the Engle case which
rather casually, even cavalierly, stated without limitation or quali-
fication that statutory relief from forfeiture is a remedy available
to the lessee. It will be noted that the statute is phrased negatively,
i.e., it does not provide that if the lessee pays the rent in arrears, or
files a bill in equity, he will thereupon be entitled to relief; but that
if he does neither he shall be barred of any right to relief. Thus,
it is possibly little more than a statute of limitation, leaving the sub-
stantive ground of relief to be determined in accordance with equit-
able principles generally. Nor, does Section 22 purport to confer
affirmatively any unequivocal right to equitable relief, but merely
to set forth certain conditions precedent to the granting of it.,, But
Section 23 does confer upon the lessee the right to stop the lessor's
action of ejectment or of unlawful detainer at any time before the
trial.
The conclusion which seems to follow from these considera-
tions is that with the exception of the instance last mentioned, (sub-
ject to the statute hereinafter discussed) there is no absolute, un-
qualified right conferred upon the lessee by the statute to relief
against a forfeiture for nonpayment of delay rentals in a lease con-
taining the drill or pay clause. In all other cases, the relief is dis-
s On the contrary, this point of the syllabus has been cited with approval
in Pyle v. Henderson, 55 W. Va. 122, 125, 46 S. E. 791, 792 (1903); Eastern Oil
Co. v. Coulehan, 65 W. Va. 531, 542, 64 S. E. 836, 841 (1909); Gales v. Ford, 126
IV. Va. 158, 168, 28 S. E.2d 429, 434 (1943).
11 Supra note 4.
10 Id. This conclusion is further supported by the last sentence of Section
23: "If the person claiming the land shall, upon bill filed as aforesaid, be
relieved in equity, he shall hold the land as before the proceedings began,
without a new lease or conveyance." (Italics supplied).
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cretionary with the court. Consequently, the statement made in
the Engle case is not accurate.
Statutory Method of Cancellation for Nonpayment of Delay
Rental. The potentialities of the situation above discussed where-
under the lessor may find that he cannot write a drill or pay type
of lease in language effective to accomplish his purpose, viz., to
destroy irrevocably the right of the lessee by reason of nonpayment
of delay rentals, were doubtless part of the background which led
to the enactment of a statute in 1943,11 amended in 1947.12 This
statute provides that, "Except in the case where operations for the
drilling of a well are being conducted thereunder, any undeveloped
lease for oil and/or gas in this State hereafter executed in which
the consideration therein provided to be paid for the privilege of
postponing actual drilling or development or for the holding of said
lease without commencing operations for the drilling of a well, com-
monly called delay rental, has not been paid when due according to
the terms of such lease, or the terms of any other agreement between
lessor and lessee, shall be null and void as to such oil and/or gas
unless payment thereof shall be made within sixty days from the
date upon which demand for payment in full of such delay rental
has been made by the lessor upon the lessee therein, as hereinafter
provided, except in such cases where a bona fide dispute shall exist
between lessor and lessee as to any amount due under such lease.
"No person, firm, corporation, partnership or association shall
maintain any action or proceeding in the courts of this State for
the purpose of enforcing or perpetuating during the term there-
of any lease heretofore executed covering oil and/or gas, as against
the owner of such oil and/or gas, or his subsequent lessee, if such
person, firm [etc.] has failed to pay to the lessor such delay rental
In full when due according to the terms thereof, for a period of six-
ty days after demand for such payment has been made by the
lessor upon such lessee, as hereinafter provided." The statute then
provides for demand to be made by notice in writing which may be
executed by personal service or, in certain instances, by publication.
A copy of the notice showing service is then to be filed in the coun-
ty clerk's office, and as to leases "hereafter executed" the clerk
shall stamp upon the margin the words "cancelled by notice", and
as to leases executed prior to the passage of the act, the words "en-
forcement barred by notice."
11 W. Va. Acts 1943, c. 63, W. VA. CODE C. 36, art. 4, §9 (a) (Michie, 1949).
12 W. Va. Acts 1947, c. 93. See Note, Williams, 49 W. VA. L. Q. 156 (1943).
5
Donley: The Drilling Clause in Oil and Gas Leases in West Virginia
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1950
DRILLING CLA USE
The act concludes: "The continuation in force of any such
lease after demand for such failure to pay such delay rental as here-
inbefore set forth is deemed by the legislature to be opposed to pub-
lic policy and against the general welfare. If any part of this act
should be declared unconstitutional such declaration shall not af-
fect any other part thereof."
It will be observed that no distinction is made between the
"unless" type and the drill or pay type of drilling clause, and, it is
submitted, that in so far as the object of the act is to remove the
lease as a cloud upon the record title of the lessor, none should be
made. But, in so far as termination is concerned, the statute is in-
applicable because the "unless" lease automatically expires upon
mere failure to pay the delay rental. Query, then, in view of the
declared purpose of the legislature, does the statute apply at all to
"unless" leases? If not, then they would not be cancellable of rec-
ord. However, the declared primary object is, as above stated, to
prevent the continuation of the lease, and, it would appear, only
secondarily to clear the record.
The constitutionality of the act, as applied to leases executed
before its enactment, is certainly open to serious doubt. If, under
the above mentioned provisions of the Code, in the light of the
statement contained in the Engle case, the lessee had, prior to the
passage of the act, a right to relief against forfeiture, it is by no
means plain that the doctrine of Le Sage v. Switzer,13 would not
apply. In that case, the court does discuss a distinction between
legislation which affects the obligation of a contract and that which
affects existing rights of court action.
It will be noted that in the statute under discussion, the first
paragraph declares the lease to be void, and the next prohibits any
action or proceeding for its enforcement or perpetuation-intend-
ing, probably, to take advantage of the distinction suggested in the
Le Sage case, and to hook the lessee upon one horn if he escape the
other one.
On the other hand, if the statute is upheld as to leases made
before its enactment (and there is no doubt of its validity as to leases
made thereafter) the law will be settled that the lessor can ir-
revocably enforce a forfeiture for nonpayment of delay rentals. This
13 116 W. Va. 657, 182 S. E. 797 (1955), holding unconstitutional W. VA.
qODE c. 55, art. 2. §5 (Michie, 1949), invalidating vendor's liens, deeds of trust,
and mortgages after twenty years from the maturity of the debt secured thereby,
in so far as purporting to apply to such liens created prior to the passage of the
act.
6
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would seem to be a definite gain both from the standpoint of public
policy and from that of the lessor in removing the uncertainties of
the law, heretofore pointed out, and in affording a simple method
of clearing his record title.
Payment of Delay Rentals. Oil and gas leases commonly pro-
vide that the delay rentals may be paid either to the lessor or de-
posited to his credit in a named bank. In the latter case, the bank
is considered the agent of the lessor and the lessee is not responsible
for the disposition thereof by the bank; nor is the payment ineffec-
tual because accompanied by a receipt to be signed by the lessor if
such signature is not made a condition precedent to the crediting of
the lessor's account.14 The payment may be made either in curren-
cy or by check or draft or otherwise.- If a blank space is left for
insertion of the number of days or months for completion of a well
before the delay rental becomes payable, testimony of the parties is
admissible and the finding of the trial chancellor will not be dis-
turbed unless plainly erroneous.16 Where a senior lease has been
avoided by the execution of a junior lease and the senior lessee there-
after pays delay rentals to the lessor with full knowledge of the
facts, he is not entitled to receive the royalties, either at law or in
equity.'
7
Methods of Enforcing Forfeiture under Drill or Pay Clause.
Although there is no right of re-entry reserved, if the lessee has fail-
ed'either to drill or pay and the lease provides that such failure
shall forfeit the lease, the lessor may enforce such forfeiture by the
execution of a new lease to a third party, which is a sufficient dec-
laration of forfeiture without demand and re-entry; and the second
lessee may maintain an action of unlawful detainer against the first
lessee. 8 But where such second lease bears an endorsement: "This
lease to be taken subject to [first lease]", the execution of the second
lease is not an unequivocal declaration of a forfeiture of the first
14 Lovett v. Eastern Oil Co., 68 W. Va. 667, 71 S. E. 250 (1911); Yoke v.
Shay, 47 W. Va. 40, 34 S. E. 748 (1899).
15 Friend v. Mallory, 52 W. Va. 53, 43 S. E. 114 (1902).
1 Yoke v. Shay, supra note 14.
17 Eclipse Oil Co. v. CGarner, 53 W'. Va. 151, 44 S. E. 131 (1903).
1s Guffey v. Hukill, 34 W. Va. 49, 11 S. E. 754 (1890), distinguishing
Bowyer v. Seymour, 13 W. Va. 12 (1878), upon the ground that there the coal
lease created a freehold estate which, at common law, could not be forfeited
except by demand and reentry. This rule is now changed by W. VA. CODIE c. 37,
art. 6, §19 (Michie, 1949), quoted, in part supra note 3.
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one."' And, whether the second lease is a declaration of a forfei-
ture depends upon the intention of the lessor, it being permissible
to show a conditional delivery thereof, i.e., that it was not to become
effective if the first lessee objected.2 0  Sometimes the rule of forfei-
tute by second lease is confused with abandonment of the lease by
cessation of operations for an extended period of time.21 No relief
from forfeiture by sec6nd lease will be granted in equity if sought
after an unreasonable delay or if the rights of an innocent third
party have intervened. 2
As a matter of interpretatiofi, a clause providing that "the fail-
ure to complete a well upon the said premises within the time spec-
ified or to pay the rentals at the time and in the manner provided
shall ipso facto work a forfeiture of this lease without notice," re-
lates only to delay rentals and not to gas well rental or royalties.2
Duty to Pay Delay Rental. Drill or Pay Clause. It is evident
that the drill or pay clause is simply an instance of a promise in the
alternative whereby the lessee promises that he will do one of two
things, viz., either commence (or complete) a well within a stipulat-
ed period of time, or, thereafter pay rental until it is commenced
(or completed). It follows, of course, that he is liable for breach of
contract in failing to do either and consequently it is uniformly
held that until surrender by the lessee, the lessor may recover the
amount of the delay rentals in an action of covenant, assumpsit or
other appropriate form of contractual remedy'4; and this is irre-
spective of the presence of a forfeiture clause, which is a condition
inserted for the benefit of the lessor which he may waive 21. It is
19 Schaupp v. Hukill, 34 W. Va. 375, 12 S. E. 501 (1890). Parol evidence
of the meaning of such endorsement was held inadmissible, but there may be
taken into consideration the situation of the parties and the surrounding
circumstances.
20 Thomas v. Hukill, 34 W. Va. 885, 397, 12 S. E. 522, 526 (1890), dis-
tinguishing Guffey v. Hukill, supra note 18.
21 Sult v. Hochstetter Oil Co., 63 W. Va. 317, 61 S. E. 307 (1908).
22 Westerman v. Dinsmore, 68 W. Va. 594, 70 S. E. 707 (1911); note, however,
that here the lessor executed the second lease and notified the first lessee of that
fact after the lessee had tendered payment of the past due rental.
23 Castle Brook Carbon Co. v. Ferrill, 76 W. Va. 300, 85 S. E. 544 (1915).
'24 Roberts v. Bettman, 45 W. Va. 143, 80 S. E. 95 (1898). The provisions
of this lease were contradictory, first stating that if the lessee failed to pay delay
rentals no right of action should accrue to either party. This wvas followed by
a surrender clause. The court properly held that this was nonsensical since
the only object of the surrender clause is to enable the lessee to avoid liability
for further rentals. Accord, as to right to recover delay rentals: Weaver v. Akin,
48 W. Va. 456, 460, 37 S. E. 600, 602 (1900) semble.
2, Similarly a clause in a coal lease providing for forfeiture may be waived
by the lessor, Hamrick v. Nutter, 93 W. Va. 115, 116 S. E. 75 (1923).
8
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immaterial that the lessee does not enter upon the land within the
term fixed for completion of the well unless prevented from doing
so by the lessor.
20
Defenses of Lessee. If the lessee cannot safely enter because of
a defect in the lessor's title, he may defeat recovery of delay rentals
even though he has failed to surrender the lease.27 Where a receiver
is appointed for the lessee, such receiver has a reasonable time after
his appointment either to accept or to surrender the lease, and if he
elects the latter the delay rentals accruing under the unoperated
and undeveloped lease cannot be paid as operating expenses of the
receivership; and, in the absence of special equities, the lessor is not
entitled to priority over other lienors for rentals accruing between
the date of the appointment of the receiver and the date of the sur-
iender of the lease..2 8
A statement by the lessor's heir, made to an assignee of the
lease that all prior delay rentals had been paid, prevents declara-
tion of a forfeiture for nonpayment of such rentals.29 When the
lessor consents that the delay rental need not be paid when due, he
may not enforce the forfeiture clause, and after such rental has ac-
crued and is unpaid, if the lessor having knowledge thereof, re-
ceives the rentals, he waives the right to enforce the forfeiture.30
So also, where a married woman's lease is invalid, acceptance of de-
lay rentals after becoming sui juris prevents her from repudiating
it. 3
1
In an action of assumpsit to recover delay rentals under a lease
executed by a husband and wife, both must be joined as plaintiffs,
and there must be either a special count or a common count suit-
able to the case. 2 The lessor may be estopped by statements that
accrued rentals have been paid and by acceptance of a smaller sum
than stipulated in the lease.33
An unusual clause is found in Hefner v. Light, etc. Co., 4
which provided that the lessee shall complete a well within a stipu-
26 Lawson v. Kirchner, 50 W. Va. 334, 40 S. E. 344 (1901); and the burden
of proving lack of title is upon the lessee, Addison v. Downing Gas Co., 120
W. Va. 401, 198 S. E. 131 (1938).
-7 Hager v. Wolfe, Ill W. Va. 449, 162 S. E. 481 (1932).
28 Waddell v. Shelton Gasoline Co., 101 IV. Va. 468, 133 S. E. 75 (1926).
20 Monarch Gas Co. v. Roy, 81 W. Va. 723, 95 S. E. 789 (1918).
•0 Hukill v. Myers, 36 W. Va. 639, 15 S. E. 151 (1892); Pyle v. Henderson,
65 W. Va. 39, 63 S. E. 762 (1909).
31 Hanley v. Richards, 116 W. Va. 127, 178 S. E. 805 (1935).
32 Sandusky v. West Fork Oil Co., 63 W. Va. 260, 59 S. E. 1082 (1907).
13 Monarch Gas Co. v. Roy, 81 W. Va. 723, 95 S. E. 789 (1918).
34 77 W. Va. 217, 87 S. E. 206 (1915).
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lated period or if not then completed pay $225.00 quarterly there-
after until oil is produced; and if no well is drilled the lessee shall
pay to the lessor $1,000.00. The lease was dated January 18, 1902,
and was for the term of ten years with the usual thereafter clause.
The assignee of the lessee paid delay rentals to October 18, 1910,
and at the expiration of the lease on January 18, 1912, no other cov-
enants had been performed. The assignee offered to surrender
the lease on October 24, 1910, at which time the delay rental which
was due six days before was unpaid. It was held that the promise
to pay delay rentals was independent of the promise to pay $1,000
if no well was drilled, wherefore, payment of the former does not
excuse nonpayment of the latter, and the lessor was entitled to re-
cover rentals maturing between October 18, 1910, and January
18, 1912, plus the $1,000.00. The lessor was justified in refusing to
accept an instrument of surrender so worded as to discharge the
assignee of all liability under the lease.
Recovery of Rentals Paid by Lessee. If the lessor's title to the
whole leased tract is defective the lessee who pays delay rentals
without knowledge of the facts rendering it so defective may recov-
er them.35 However, in order to justify recovery there must have
been a total failure of consideration, and thus if the lease purports
to cover 288 acres but the lessor owns only an undivided half inter-
est in the oil under 67 acres, the lessee cannot recover upon a decla-
ration in assumpsit containing only the common counts and a spe-
cial count alleging total failure of consideration." But recovery
can be had upon a special count alleging partial failure of considera-
tion, of such proportion of the total delay rental paid as the lands as
to which title was defective bears to the total acreage leasedY.
The Unless Clause. The distinctive feature of the unless drilling
clause is that the lessee does not promise to do anything. The provi-
sion is that unless he commences (or completes) a well within a
stipulated period or pays delay rental, the lease shall come to an end.
Consequently, failure to do either simply terminates the leasehold es-
tate and the lessee is not liable for payment of the delay rentals."8
sr Gaffney v. Stowers, 73 W. Va. 420, 80 S. E. 501 (1913),
36 The Philadelphia Co. v. Shackelford, 83 W. Va. 280, 98 S. E. 568 (1919).
37 Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Jarvis, 88 W. Va. 396, 106 S. E. 889 (1921).
38 Snodgrass v. South Penn Oil Co., 47 W. Va. 509, 35 S. E. 820 (1900),
approved in Weaver v. Akin, 48 W. Va. 456, 37 S. E. 600 (1900); Smith v. South
Penn Oil Co., 59 W. Va. 204, 53 S. E. 152 (1906), holding that if, after drilling
an unproductive well the lessee is permitted, without further payments, to
drill another, he is not liable in an action of assumpsit for use and occupation
measured by the amount of the delay rentals; nor for the delay rentals as such.
10
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The failure to observe this distinction has resulted in loose and in-
accurate expressions in some of the cases.3 9 In Pyle v. Henderson,40
it was urged by counsel, quite correctly, that there is no such thing
as the "forfeiture" of an unless lease, and that the only way in
which to extend it is by the execution of a new lease. The veiy
able Judge Brannon said "this distinction is quite refined and un-
practical", and proceeded to treat the lease as one of the drill or
pay type in which the lessor could waive a forfeiture-a plainly erro-
neous conclusion. In Weaver v. Akin 41 it was provided that if no
well is commenced within thirty days from date the lease should be-
come void unless the lessee paid $300.00 annually for each year
thereafter that such completion is delayed. The court said that the
lease, after the expiration of the thirty-day period was "a mere
option determinable at the will of the lessor ... the lessor could
void it at his pleasure . . . As long as the rent was paid the lease
would run. To destroy its optionary character the rent must be paid
in advance." This statement is obviously erroneous, for if the rental
were not paid in advance the leasehold estate would instantly be
wiped out; the lessor would have no option to keep it alive at his
pleasure. Any future dealings between the parties would be simply
a verbal arrangement or oral lease which, as elsewhere pointed out,
is now ineffective under the Statute of Conveyances. 42
To! Whom Delay Rentals Are Payable. If one cotenant exe-
cutes a lease purporting to cover the whole of the commonly owned
property, his cotenants are not entitled to share in the delay rentals
paid by the lessee unless they ratify or acquiesce in the lease; and a
demand for discovery and accounting does not amount to such rat-
ification.43 It has been held that the grantee of an undivided in-
terest in oil and gas which is then subject to a lease, and who was
also granted the right to lease the entire tract and to receive all delay
rentals accruing under subsequent leases, cannot even by express
language assign such right to a third person. 44 This decision is
criticized elsewhere. 45 Where lands are subject to oil and gas leases
39 In Henne v. South Penn Oil Co., 52 W. Va. 192, 43 S. E. 147 (1902), the
court speaks of the forfeiture clause in a case involving an "unless" drilling
clause.
40 65 W. Va. 39, 63 S. E. 762 (1909).
4' 48 W. Va. 456, 460, 37 S. E. 600, 602 (1900).
42 The analysis of this point is beyond the scope of this article.
43 McNeely v. South Penn Oil Co., 58 W. Va. 438, 52 S. E. 480 (1905);
Patterson v. Clem, 79 W. Va. 666, 91 S. E. 654 (1917); Lewis, Adm'r v. Milam,
113 W. Va. 549, 169 S. E. 70 (1933).
4- Rawling v. Fisher, 101 W. Va. 253, 132 S. E. 489 (1926).
45 The discussion of this case is beyond the scope of this artide.
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executed by a personal representative pursuant to the authority of
a will, and the devisees convey undivided interests in royalties and
for a period of twenty-two years the grantees thereof accept royalties
and make no claim to delay rentals, they are estopped to make
such claim.4C Where the lessee's promise to pay delay rentals is
made to the husband and wife as lessors, even though she has but
an inchoate dower interest, it is a promise to joint obligees and she
must be made a party plaintiff in an action to recover such rentals.47
In a case involving a lease to mine sand, it was provided that if the
mining ceased for a period of two years at any time or if the lessee
failed to pay $100.00 annually, which was to be deducted from the
first royalty, the lease should be void. The lessor thereafter con-
tracted to convey the land reserving the rents and profits until a
specified date. It was held that a tender of the "rent" to the lessor
within such period of time was sufficient. 48
What Is "Commencement" of a Well. A lease provided that
the lessee would commence "operations" for a test well within one
year and complete the same within 18 months from such commence-
ment, and in the event that the lessee failed "to so commence and
complete said test well, the lease shall be forfeited." Before the
expiration of the one-year period the lessee located the well, hewed
the timbers which were afterward used in building the derrick,
contracted for the drilling and ordered machinery to be hauled
to the location, but neither the timber nor the machinery were
delivered there before the expiration of the year by reason of the
impassable condition of the roads. The well was completed within
18 months from the date of the lease. It was held that the lessee
could not be ejected from the premises; that "commencement"
46 Guffey Oil & Gas Royalties, Inc. v. Marshall, 109 W. Va. 180, 153 S. E.
291 (1930).
47 Sandusky v. Oil Co., 73 W. Va. 260, 59 S. E. 1082 (1907); cf. Bowen v.
W. Va. Gas Corp., 121 W. Va. 403, 3 S. E.2d 629 (1939); cf. Freeman v. Swiger,
83 W. Va. 425, 98 S. E. 440 (1919), where the principle of joint obligation is
applied to the contract of a husband and wife to execute a lease. See also Allen
v. South Penn Oil Co., 72 W. Va. 155, 77 S. E. 905 (1913), holding that a deed
by husband and wife conveying oil and gas and providing for payment to the
"grantor" in the future, of part of the purchase money, creates a joint obligation.
48 Pheasant v. Hanna, 63 W. Va. 613, 60 S. E. 618 (1908). The payment
was called "commutation" money by the court. Query, whether it was not
simply minimum royalty with a condition of forfeiture attached? Cf. Sun
Lumber Co. v. Nelson Fuel Co., 88 W. Va. 61, 106 S. E. 41 (1921), payment to
grantor of timber for privilege of extending right to remove it, held sufficient
where land had been conveyed to third party without the knowledge of the
grantee.
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does not require the actual penetration of the strata by the drill
where the lessee is required to commence "operations.."49.
What Is "Completion" of a Well. Drilling clauses, whether
!n the "unless" type of lease or in the drill or pay type, quite
commonly provide that a well must be completed within a specified
time. No decision has been made in West Virginia upon the
precise point. However, it has been held that under a drilling
contract the sinking of a well to a specified sand is a completion
within the meaning of the contract, and that where the language
of a written guaranty of the contract is ambiguous, parol evidence
Is admissible to show that the words "completion of a well now
drilling" were not meant to include extra work done after reaching
the stipulated sand 0 And, in an agency and option contract
authorizing sale or purchase of property at an agreed price until a
well then being drilled was "drilled in and completed", the time
limit extends to the time immediately before the drilling in and
completion of such well into and through all the oil and gas bearing
sands in the vicinity of the well; the words "drilled in" and "com-
pleted" being synonymous.51
Effect of Completion of an Unprofitable Well. In Steelsmith
v. Gartlan5 2 a lease for a term. of five years and as long thereafter
as oil or gas is produced in paying quantities, provided that in the
event no well was completed within one month the lease should be
void unless the lessee paid $50.00 per month rental in advance
until a well was completed. Within two months the lessee drilled
a well to a depth of 180 feet and found no oil or gas, following
which he removed the tools, left the property and discontinued the
monthly payments. It was held that the lease had terminated. The
result is quite sound in view of the abandonment of the lease. But
the court seemed to interpret the lease as requiring such a decision
in order to avoid the conclusion that, otherwise, the lessee could
complete an unproductive well and then continue to hold the
premises for the remainder of the five-year term without doing
anything more. This would not follow because of the implied
obligation of the lessee fully to develop the property.
49 Fleming Oil 8- Gas Co. v. South Penn Oil Co., 37 W. Va. 645, 17 S. E.
203 (1893).
5o Henderson v. Kessel, 93 W. Va. 60, 116 S. E. 68 (1923).
51 Chambers v. Simmons, 76 W. Va. 174, 85 S. E. 182 (1915).
52 45 W. Va. 27, 29 S. E. 978 (1898).
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In Parish Fork Oil Co. v. Bridgewater Gas Co.,53 a fifteen-year
term drill or pay type of lease provided that when the first well
was completed, then all delay rentals should cease. The court
questioned whether this provision means "that such cash rental
shall cease only when a producing well is completed and operated
on the premises, or that the completion of a nonproducing well
extinguishes the obligation to pay rent and places the lease within
the principle announced in Steelsmith v. Gartlan." It was decided
that the latter interpretation was the correct one; that if the parties
intended that a producing well was necessary in order to terminate
the delay rental they should have expressly so stated. It is obvious
that the completion of a producing well ipso facto ends the obliga-
tion to pay delay rental; therefore, there would be no point in
having a clause that completion of a "well" ended it unless the
parties meant thereby that a nonproducing well should so operate.
Thus, it was held that, under such a provision, the completion of
a nonproducing well ends the obligation to pay delay rental.
Another mode of expressing the same intention is to provide that
"the completion of a well shall be and operate as a full liquidation
of all rental under this provision during the remainder of the term
of this lease."5 4 It follows, therefore, and was so decided in Smith
v. South Penn Oil Co.,55 that in the absence of a "liquidation of
rentals clause" or its equivalent, the completion of a nonproductive
well does not absolve the lessee from payment of delay rental in
order to keep alive an "unless" lease. However, the court went
further and held that the words "unless a well shall be completed"
and "until a well is completed" are ambiguous, saying: "What
kind of a well? Some are productive, and some are unproductive
... " Therefore it was held that the conduct of the parties
- hereby the lessor permitted the lessee to drill a second well without
requiring the payment of additional delay rental, is conclusive
under the doctrine of practical construction, in an action of
assumpsit by the lessor to recover for use and occupation of the
land. It is submitted that the court was correct in denying such
a recovery. It cannot be conceded, however, that the quoted words
are ambiguous. They cannot be so for one purpose and not for
another, and admittedly in an "unless" lease the completion of
r3 51 W. Va. 583, 42 S. E. 655 (1902).
54 Quoted from Henne v. South Penn Oil Co., 52 W. Va. 192, 43 S. E. 147
(1902).
55 59 W. Va. 204, 53 S. E. 152 (1905).
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a dry hole would not prevent termination, as a matter of law56-
not as a matter of fact to be decided by reference to the conduct
of the parties.
50 Id. At page 206 it was said, "The lease contains, not a covenant to pay
rent, but only a clause, giving'the lessee the option or privilege of paying a
specific sum every three months in advance, as a means of keeping the lease
alive and operative. It was not bound to do so and could, without violation of
any terms in the lease, allow its rights to be forfeited [meaning to expire] and
to cease and determine by failure to drill a well or pay said sum."
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